Model simulations are run to obtain a range of realistic estimates of the long-run revenue impact of a capital-gains tax-rate cut to a maximum of 15 percent. The basic vehicle for the simulations is a slightly modified version of the Galper-Lucice-Toder (GLT) general equilibrium model. The key behavioral assumptions affecting the estimates are:
How a capital gains tax rate cut affects federal tax revenues has dominated recent discussion of capital gains taxation. No matter how appropriate a cut might be in terms of increasing economic efficiency if a cut decreases tax revenues, it is unlikely to be implemented. Conversely no matter how inappropriate a cut might be from an equity perspective, if a cut increases tax revenues, it is likely to be adopted. The issue is whether behavioral responses are sufficient to offset the direct reduction in revenues caused by the rate cut. The existing literature provides no clear answer (see Auerbach, 1988 , Cook and O'Hare, 1987 , and Toder and Ozanne, 1988 , for reviews).
The empirical literature concentrates on the realizations response (Lindsey, 1987ab and the above references), which is certainly the most important if one is concerned with the impact of capital gains tax rate changes on capital gains tax revenues only. However, other responses must be considered if one is concerned with the wider impact on total federal capital income tax revenues. While capital gains will be realized more quickly if the gains rate is cut, less corporate income will be paid as "dividends" and more as capital gains (Poterba, 1987) . Moreover, owners of noncorporate enterprises may characterize less of capital income (or of their personal labor income) as current income and more as capital gains.
These responses further increase capital gains revenues but decrease total tax revenues from capital income. In addition, a lower gains rate will lead households to realign their asset portfolios and will induce a reallocation *The authors are grateful to Eric Toder and Harvey Calper for comments on an earlier draft. Discussions with Toder regarding the taxation of noncorporate income were especially helpful.
2 of the underlying tangibLe capital stock. While these indirect responses have usually been viewed as lowering total capital income tax revenues (Cook and O'Hare, 1987, and Toder and Ozanne, 1988) . the responses can just as well raise revenues and, in fact, do so in our simulations.
In the short run, a capital gains tax cut will almost certainly raise tax revenues. The two revenue-losing or potentially losing responses, the redirection of income from dividends to capital gains and the reallocations of portfolios and tangible capital stocks, will occur gradually. Thus the dominant response will be an increase in realizations.
More important, the initial increase in realizations will vastly exceed the long-run increase, owing to the one-time unlocking of existing capital gains, if the previous higher rate had been in place for a lengthy period.
Our concern, however, is solely with the long-run impact on federal capital income tax revenues. The specific capital gains tax cut analyzed is the reduction to a maximum rate of 15 percent.
Unfortunately, we know little about any of the relevant behavioral responses. While many studies have measured realization responses to capital gains tax rate changes, the variation in these estimates is wide and the interpretation of them is uncertain. Some studies have examined corporate payout behavior, but these studies do not have a strong theoretical base, and no one, not surprisingly, has measured noncorporate recharacterization responses. Some work exists on portfolio shifts, but it is insufficiently comprehensive or precise to be useful in this context.
We employ a portfolio choice model to compute tax revenue effects. Household j's utility-maximizing shares of wealth in the three risky assets (4) can be expressed as
where m is household j's utility per dollar of expected income, 4 is the degree of household j's risk aversion on risky asset k, is the share of variance included in the tax base, and TRANS reflects the impact of the variance in government tax revenues owing to the variance in revenues from asset k on household i's demand for asset k.
Holdings of the risk-free taxable bond are derived residually from the household balance sheet identity: Four market-clearing equations for fully taxable bonds (TAX), taxexempts, corporate equity and noncorporate equity close the model (and can be thought of as determining the pretax returns on these assets):
(1.8)
where the h are the number of households in representative cell j. For owner housing and consumer durables, demand and supply are defined as equal for each household.
II. Modeling the Impact of the Tax Cut
Capital gains taxation works through the inclusion factors, the ak and a in the portfolio share demand equations. For an asset whose entire return is received as current income and is fully taxed, such as risk-free taxable bonds, a -1. For other assets, the greater the proportion of the return that takes the capital gains form, the longer the gains are deferred, and the lower is the capital gains tax rate, the lower are ak and a. In the CLT model, taxable returns with favorable capital gains tax treatment are those on equity investments in corporate and noncorporate business. The taxable variances with favorable capital gains treatment are those on equity investments and tax-exempt bonds.
The inclusion factors can be related to the fraction of true income that accrues directly to households (p), the proportion of variance in income that is attributable to this accrual (v), the effective realization rate (the concurrent equivalent realization of. currently nonaccruing income --capital gains, rr), and the fraction of realized gains that are excluded from taxes (x). With these definitions, Tax Act, the rate rose to 0.7, assuming a slight increase to 0.4 in the dividend payout ratio [0.7-0.4 + 0.5(0.6)]. The v fraction was one-sixth the p fraction under pre1986 law but one-quarter under the 1986 Tax Act.
The GLT treatment of the noncorporate income and variance inclusion * rates ts less helpful; they set v and p equal to zero. That is, thetr akak -(l-x)rr rise from 0.2 to 0.5 because x declines from 0.6 to 0.0. Zero values for v and p seem inconsistent with their overall analysis (clearly the 1986 Tax Act increased these parameters, i.e., reduced the deferral of noncorporate income). In no case did CLT explicitly change the realization rate for either corporate or noncorporace capital gains. Setting the inclusion rates for the returns and variances under the proposed capital gains tax cut is straightforward. Because the new 15 percent rate constitutes a gains exclusion that varies with the regular income tax rate of the household, the inclusion rates are also household specific. More precisely, the rates are those described by the a.K and a expressions with x replaced by l-O.lS/&. Our base simulation, then, is one in which the parameter values are those in the lower right corner of Table 3 but with x shifted from 0.0 to l-0.lS/t.
The impact of inclusion-rate changes on portfolio demands for corporate and noncorporate equities is complicated by the fact that the changes increase both the numerator (the return inclusion rate) and denominator (the variance inclusion rate) in the share demand equations.
Only if the percentage increase in the numerator, generated by the increased after-tax return, is greater than the percentage increase in the denominator, induced by the increased after-tax variance, will the share demand tend to increase. This is not the case for some households in the simulations reported below, However, because the after-tax variance on taxexempt bonds, but not the return, is increased, households in the 28 and 33 percent tax brackets will tend to shift out of tax exempts. Another complication is that m , the utility per dollar of expected income, is endogenous, depending on the prices of goods in the model. As a result, intuitive explanations of portfolio changes are often not easily provided.
III. Results
Portfolios Total federal taxes are the sum of Taxi over all j. The tax revenues lost from a tax rate cut must be made up in some manner for the model to be internally consistent. In order to avoid altering marginal tax rates and thus introducing other tax effects into the simulation, we assume a proportional tax on consumption of sufficient magnitude to leave the federal budget unchanged. Table S In the static case, tax cuts occur only for those in the 28 and 33 percent tax brackets and the percentage reduction rises with income because higher income househ9lds hold proportionately greater quantities of the assets that receive the more favorable tax treatment. In the dynamic case, tax changes depend on changes in pretax interest rates and in portfolio and capital stock redistributions As can be seen, business capital increases, largely at the expense of household capital. The former is induced by 10 and 6 basis point declines, respectively, in the pretax yields on corporate and noncorporate equity and is accompanied by a reduction in the corporate debt-capital ratio; the latter is largely attributable to a decrease in marginal tax rates, which raises the after-tax debt rate. The reduction in zero-taxed assets by the 28 and 33 percent tax rate households reflects this reduction in marginal tax rate and thus in household capital demands (the marginal tax rate of the highest income household class rises slightly because some of these households shift down into the 33 percent bracket).
tn all cases, the capital stock changes are a half to one percent of the base level,
Alter-native Realization. Payout, and Recharacterization Assumotions
We now consider the impact of alternative realization, payout, and recharacterization assumptions. Table 6 lists the alternatives for both the 1986 Tax Act and the cut in the capital gains tax rate. The former are needed because the simulated impact of the 1986 Tax Act itself varies when changes in realizations et cetera are incorporated, and it is from these new equilibria that the capital gains tax rate is presumed to shift the economy.
For small increases in realizations, an elasticity of -0.5 with respect to a change in the statutory capital gains tax rate is posited for corporate equity, i.e., a rough halving of the gains rate (from 0.28 or 0.33 to 0.15) is assumed to raise realizations by 50 percent, and -0.3 is posited for noncorporate equity. For moderate increases in realizations, elasticities of -1.0 and -0.6 are assumed; for large increases, -1.5 and -0.9 are assumed.
The assumed corporate payoUt response is based on Poterba's recent study. In his framework, dividends depend on both earnings and a tax preference parameter, 8, which is a weighted average across shareholders of the ratio of the current-equivalent after-tax income from a dollar of dividend payout to that from the capital gains he assumes would result from a dollar of retained earnings: Table 3 and those shown in Table 6 , Table 7 contains the static and dynamic revenue losses for all cases The dynamic responses tend to dampen the decline in tax revenues by $1.5 billion when realization responses are low, but by less than $0.5 billion when realizations are high. The dampening occurs largely because capital tends to be reallocated toward taxed assets (corporate and noncorporate capital) and away from non-taxed assets (household and state and local capital). These capital stock shifts and changes in pretax interest rates and corporate structure are shown for all the different cases in Table 8 .
The business capital stock increases are caused by the gains rate cut, although the increases are cushioned to the extent that realizations increase and soften the impact of the rate cut (reduce the shift toward the partially taxed equities) The increased demand for equities and decreased 1.8 demand for tax-exempt securities cause the pretax returns on the former to fall by 2 to 10 basis points and on the latter to rise by 2 to 3 basis points. The quantity of state and local capital falls in response to this rate increase; the demand for household capital falls, in spite of a general minor decline in the fully taxable rate, because of a reduction in the average marginal tax rate of some households and a decrease in the fraction of households that itemize, both of which increase the net-of-tax debt rate. Table 9 illustrates portfolio shifts in what we view as the most likely case (moderate increase in realizations and decrease in payouts and recharacterizations). The highest income class shifts slightly from partially and zero taxed assets into fully-taxed bonds; the lowest three income classes switch from fully to partially taxed assets; and the middle income class switches from zero taxed assets (largely household capital) to partially taxed equities. The portfolio shifts are not large though. For example, the largest absolute change, the 1.1 percentage point increase in the middle income (.28L) class's holdings of partially taxed other assets, is only a 3 percent portfolio shift (increase from 30 to 31 percent) -Our final experiment is one in which the capital gains tax rate cut is applied to corporate equities only. Limiting the tax cut to corporate equity obviously would substantially lessen the potential revenue loss. (Cravelle and Lindsey, 1988) .
The essential message of this paper is that the strong emphasis in the literation on the realization response to a capital gains tax rate cut has been appropriate. The payout/recharacterization and portfolio redistribution/reallocationì effects do not appear to be large. Moreover, the portfolio responses, within the context of the CLT model, act to raise tax revenues (substitution of taxable business capital for taxfree household and state and local capital), not lower them as has been conjectured. Thus these responses offset the payout/recharacterization effects, leaving the realization response as basically the total response. Future research could, of course, modify this finding.
As to future research, extension of three financial assets in the model to include a pure capital gains asset (equity in farming and oil and gas production?) would be appropriate in order to better measure portfolio effects. Also, realization and payout responses should be built directly into the model. Utility losses from deviations of realization rates and payout rates from those that would exist if gains weren't taxed could be specified and optimal realization and payout rates could be computed as those that balanced these losses against gains in after-tax income.
Further, the tax parameter affecting corporate payouts could be computed internally in the model. A related endeavor would be to recompute historic values of the tax parameter using estimates of the optimal realization rate and to relate historic payout rates to the recomputed tax parameter. Note: In all calculations we assume v -p/6 for corporate equity and v -p -0.2857 for noncorporate equity.
* Income inclusion rates for 30% tax bracket. The essential message of this paper is that the strong emphasis in the literation on the realization response to a capital gains tax rate cut has been appropriate. The payout/recharacterization and portfolio redistribution/reallocation effects do not appear to be large. Moreover, the portfolio responses, within the context of the GLT model, act to raise tax revenues (substitution of taxable business capital for taxfree household and state and local capital), not lower them as has been conjectured. Thus these responses offset the payout/recharacterization effects, leaving the realization response as basically the total response.
Future research could, of course, modify this finding.
